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Willingness-to-Pay for Organic Food 
Products and Organic Purity: 
Experimental Evidence 
 
by Jesse L. Strzok and Wallace E. Huffman1 - Most recent revision: 11/6/12 
The market for organic products has been growing rapidly over the past decade, and is now 
available not only in specialty stores like Whole Foods but also in Hy-Vee and other large 
grocery stores and super markets.  Even Wal-Mart and Target carry organic produce and dairy 
products. This paper uses information collected in laboratory experiments to test the 
hypothesis that some consumers are willing-to-pay more for organic than conventional food 
and that they will pay more for organic food with higher degrees of organic purity. The 
participants in the experiments are from the Ames, IA area.  The experimental products are 
organic and conventional coffee, maple syrup and olive oil.  We found that participants were 
willing to pay higher prices for an organic product with high levels of organic purity.  Also, 
individuals with more education were willing to pay more for organic relative to conventional 
products and addition household income (per capita basis) increases willingness-to-pay for 
organic products up to $76,100, and willingness-to-pay decreased as per capita household 
income increased above $76,100. 
                                                      
1 The authors are graduate student and C.F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor of Agriculture and Life Science, 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University. We thank the Seed Science Center and the Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Stations for financial assistance. We thank Iowa State University’s Nutrition and Wellness Research 
Center for use of their facilities for the setting of the laboratory experiments. 
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Introduction 
The market for organic food in the United States has been steadily growing over the 
past two decades.  These products must carry a label to differentiate them from conventional 
products.   Various organic groups, e.g., California Certified Organic Farmers, and a few states, 
e.g., California and Texas, developed organic standards first.  However, as organic standards 
proliferated, some organic producers and consumers raised concern and lobbied for a 
recognizable national standard.  Small organic producers, however, did not want an expensive 
organic certification/inspection system.  The 1990 farm bill included the Organic Foods 
Production Act.  The Act asked the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national list of allowed 
synthetic substances that may be used, and a list of prohibited substances that could not be 
used in organic production and handling operations.  The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service 
developed these standards, which are known as the National Organic Program (NOP) and they 
first went into effect in October, 2002. 
Production standards for organic are “process based,” i.e., the national organic 
standards address the “production process” or the methods, practices, and substances used in 
producing and handling crops, livestock, and processed agricultural products.  The 
requirements apply to the way that products are created, not to measurable properties of the 
resulting product itself.  Although specific practices and materials used by organic operation 
may vary, the standards require every aspect of organic production and handling to comply 
with the provisions of the Organic Foods Production Act (USDA: AMS 2000), including the list of 
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approved and prohibited practices, methods and substances (USDA: AMS 2011). Also, annual 
audits of records are required of USDA certified organic food. 
Under the NOP, different purity levels exist, and those products with the highest degree 
of purity may carry the USDA’s “Organic Seal.” Products consisting of all ingredients that are 
organically sourced can be labeled as “100 percent organic” and carry the USDA seal. Products 
that are sourced with at least 95% organic ingredients may be labeled as “organic,” and they 
may also carry the USDA’s organic seal. Those products which contain at least 70% organically 
produced ingredients may be labeled as “made with organic ingredients” but cannot display the 
USDA’s organic seal. Any product with less than 70% organically sourced ingredients cannot 
display “organic” except upon the ingredients statement, and the USDA seal may not be used. 2  
In contrast, in the EU only products which are 95% or greater organically sourced may be 
labeled as “organic.”3 
The production of organic food raises the cost of production relative to conventional 
products, and the production of organic products with higher percentages of organic 
ingredients also raise the cost of production.  Hence, a key issue is whether consumers are 
willing to pay more for these products. There exist a number of studies which show that 
consumers exhibit a greater willingness-to-pay (WTP) for organic products over conventional 
products with identical appearance. For example, in a study of organic versus conventional 
                                                      
2 Several additional requirements must be met by producers which can be found by visiting the European 
Commission’s website – ec.europa.eu or the USDA’s website – usda.gov. 
3 On February 15, 2012 (effective June 1, 2012), the “U.S. – European Union Organic Equivalence Arrangement” 
was made, which means the EU and the United States will recognize each other’s organic production rules and 
control systems as equivalent for three years. In this particular case the EU will label “100 percent organic” and 
“organic” products from the United States simply as “organic.” For products “made with organic ingredients” from 
the United States, the EU will reference the organic ingredients on the ingredients statement. 
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apples with identical appearance, Yue, Alfes and Jensen (2009) show 75 percent of participants 
were willing to pay more for the organic apples. However, to the best of our knowledge we 
know of no literature dealing with specific levels of organic purity of food products or seriously 
at the impact of socio-economic factors. 
This paper uses information collected in laboratory experiments to test the hypothesis 
that consumers are willing to pay more for organic than conventional food and that they will 
pay more for organic food with higher degrees of organic purity. The participants in the 
experiments are from the Ames, IA area, but perhaps best described as being employees of 
Iowa State University (ISU). Approximately 85% of the participants are employed by or students 
of ISU.  The experimental products are organic and conventional coffee, maple syrup and olive 
oil.4 We design a random nth-price auction to elicit values from participants. Although Vickrey’s 
(1961) second-price auction is demand revealing in theory and has an endogenous market-
clearing price, off-margin bidders can bid insincerely with few consequences if these bids fall 
below the market-clearing price, see Shogren et al. (2001). For this reason a random nth-price 
auction, which can also induce sincere bidding in theory, is used instead of second-price (or 
some other known nth-price) auction for better empirical results. This paper unfolds in the 
following sections.  
Recruitment  
To obtain subjects for our experiments, we reduced the cost by advertising in the Ames 
area. We advertised the opportunity to participate in a short experiment in economic decision 
                                                      
4 The goods were chosen as they are considered credence goods in the experiment (goods were not consumed in 
the experiment) as-well-as in use for many consumers.  
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making with food, which were to be run in July, 2012. They were also informed that participants 
were required to be between 18 and 65 years of age and all participants would be paid $20 for 
their participation.  The dates and times of proposed experiment sessions were also included. 
Interested parties then contacted us either by email or phone to sign up for a session time 
which worked for them.   
The aim of the experiment is to have frequent purchasers of groceries be participants in 
the study; this study focuses on the buying habits of the representative consumer.  Hence, we 
excluded people under the age of 18 and people over the age of 65. We believe that people 
under 18 are more likely to still live at home, not be the main purchaser of groceries, or be less 
involved in food preparation and planning. Similarly, people aged 65 and over as they are more 
likely have different purchasing habits, dietary concerns, and may have their meals provided for 
them. 
We requested each potential participant to tell us three different session times which 
would work for them. This gave us some flexibility to combine individuals into group of 12-20 
per session. Once participants were assigned to a session, we notified them of their session 
date and time.  We also sent an additional reminder notification approximately 24 hours before 
their session with directions and the time of their session. We obtained 154 volunteers for our 
experiments. 
Experimental Method and Design 
After participants arrived at the experiment location all participants were first asked to 
sign a consent form. Next, they were given and ID number to insure anonymity, an instructions 
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and bid packet (hereafter packet), and then told to enter the lab.  Once in the lab, they were 
told to complete a short questionnaire (asking socio-economic questions, knowledge about 
organic foods, and whether they read food labels).  To reduce concerns among participants 
about a cash constraint, the participants were paid $20 as promised for participating. They 
signed a receipt and this occurred before any instructions about the auctions were read.  
In our experiments, only one session was run at a time, and each session had one 
monitor and one assistant. The packet included information on the experimental products that 
were to be bid on, and explanation of a random nth-price auction, a quiz on the auction format, 
and the bid instructions for each round. In addition to the packet, the session monitor also 
reviewed all of the information with the participants. 
Participants were then informed by the session monitor that they would be bidding on 
three experimental commodities, that only one of several rounds of biding would be binding, 
and asked for all bids submitted to be non-negative in value. They were also informed that 
there would be a practice round using candy bars, but this would not be binding. At this point 
they were also informed that winning experimental products may come in a different container 
than those shown in the lab experiments.  Participants were also asked to refrain from 
communicating with other participants and any questions should be directed to the monitor. 
The (private value) random nth-price auction was chosen because of its superior 
performance in auctions of relatively new products. Participants were told that in random nth-
price auction, each participant places a bid on all auctioned products. Then bids are collected, 
ranked from highest-to-lowest and assigned a number representing their rank (i.e. the highest 
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bid is 1 and he 4th highest bid is 4). A number is then randomly generated from a uniform 
distribution between 2 and k where k is the number of participants in the auction. This number, 
n, is then the price of the winning bid (the nth-price) and any participant who bid higher wins 
the auction.  Hence, this auction is different from many auctions in that all participants place 
bids, and there are multiple winners. Participants were also told that their best strategy (a 
weakly dominant strategy) was to bid sincerely (common practice in such auctions). In all of the 
rounds of bidding, including the practice round, participants were told that they could examine 
the products before placing bids. 
Next, participants were given a hypothetical example, which was followed by a short 
quiz to test their understanding of the random nth-price auction. The monitor went over the 
correct answers and provided explanations when questions were raised.  Next, the practice 
round and an auction of candy bars followed.  Participants came to the front to examine the 
candy on a table in the front of the lab.  After the monitor collected all bids, they were rank-
ordered, the random nth-price was chosen and winning bids and bidders were identified.  Any 
remaining questions were addressed. 
Next, the auction turned to the three experimental products – coffee, maple syrup, and 
olive oil. The coffee was ¼ pound whole bean Arabica bean French roast, the maple syrup was 
250 milliliters US Grade A dark amber, and the olive oil was 250 milliliters cold-pressed extra 
virgin. These are widely purchased commodities by U.S. households and are available in the 
market as USDA “100 percent organic” ingredients. The latter attribute permitted us to 
accurately label our organic lab products as having at least 95%, 97% or 99% organic 
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ingredients. Conventional versions of these products were also readily available in local grocery 
stores. 
Experimental products were properly grouped and placed under bins on a table in the 
font of the lab.  Across sessions, the ordering of the grouping of products was randomized to 
minimize sequencing effects.  Participants were then asked one-by-one to the front of the room 
to view and examine the products. Then, they were to return to their seat and write down bid 
prices on the bid sheets provided in their packet. When this was complete, the participants laid 
the bid sheet face down and the assistant picked up the bid sheets.  After all bids were 
collected in a session (three rounds of bidding), bids were ranked-ordered by commodity with 
participants ID numbers displayed. The random n was generated and winners were identified. 
The auction of experimental commodities consisted of two “treatments.” The first 
treatment included an organic product and a conventional product of the same type, e.g., 
coffee. Organic products might contain at least 95%, 97% or 99% organic ingredients.  Under 
the second treatment, participants were asked to bid on a product differing in the purity of 
organic ingredients, e.g., coffee with at least 95%, 97%, or 99% organic ingredients.  We ran 
eight sessions under the first treatment, and two sessions under the second treatment.  
Participants were randomly assigned among sessions. 
Under the first treatment, an example of how the rounds of bidding in a session might look as 
presented: 
Round 1 – Olive Oil: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic” with additional 
information in the packet stating the “olive oil labeled as organic is at least 97% organic.”  
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Round 2 – Maple Syrup: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic” with 
additional information in the packet stating the “maple syrup labeled as organic is at least 95% organic.”  
Round 3 – Coffee: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic” with additional 
information in the packet stating the “coffee labeled as organic is at least 99% organic.” 
 Under the second treatment, an example of how the rounds of bidding in a session 
might look as presented: 
Round 1 – Olive Oil: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels shown, 
“at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.”  
Round 2 – Maple Syrup: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels 
shown, “at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.” 
Round 3 – Coffee: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels shown, 
“at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.” 
By presenting the participants with three different levels of purity of coffee, maple 
syrup or olive oil, we anticipated we could exaggerate the differences in WTP for small 
differences in organic purity levels. Why run such a treatment?  This is similar to how the 
products are often presenting at grocery stores; partially organic, organic, and 100% organic 
items are frequently side-by-side.  
Data and Results 
We ran ten sessions at the Nutrition and Wellness Research Center at ISU Research Park 
in Ames, Iowa during July, 2012.  Eight sessions (129 participants although one participant’s 
data was missing) were run with the first treatment and two sessions (25 participants) of the 
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second treatment were run. Sessions ranged in size from 11 to 21 participants. Please see Table 
1 for characteristics and additional data summaries of participants and Table 2 for numbers of 
participants for each product and purity level. 
Data Analysis 
In the following data analysis we will present the analysis of the data collected from the 
two treatments. For both treatments we test for equality of mean bid prices. Next, we conduct 
a regression analysis of bid price date from individual observations on prices of organic and 
conventional food products and run equality of means tests of the differences.  
Equality of Means 
Treatment one 
We tested equality of mean for each good between conventional and a certain 
percentage of organic and between different percentages of organic. Due to the design of the 
experiment we have WTP bids for the conventional products for each participant but only 
approximately one-third as many WTP bids for each organic good of a certain percentage of 
purity. We ran t-tests between the means of the organic bids and conventional bids looking for 
significant differences as-well-as between the means of the organic goods (different 
percentages).  These are run with all bids and again with bids of zero omitted. Our hypothesis of 
equal means was rejected in most cases; often, consumers have a greater WTP for higher 
organic purity. In cases which it is not, cases of interest, it is discussed. We use a conventional 
confidence level of 10%; we present confidence levels if they were equal to 10% or greater.  
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Coffee 
For coffee, mean bids for an organic product is significantly larger than for the mean for 
conventional product. The mean bid for organic coffee with ≥97% organic ingredients has the 
highest bids. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean bid of organic coffee of ≥95% 
organic ingredients is equal to the mean price of organic coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients. 
However, we reject the null hypothesis that the mean price of coffee with ≥97% organic 
ingredients is equal to the mean of coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients, forcing us to fail to 
reject the alternative hypothesis that coffee with ≥97% organic ingredients is greater than 
coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients.   
When omitting bids of zero, we faced many more cases where we failed to reject the 
null hypothesis of equal mean bid prices.  We failed to reject the hypothesis that the mean 
price of coffee with ≥95% organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean prices and 
coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients. We also failed to reject the hypothesis that the mean 
price of coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean prices of 
coffee. Again, we failed to reject the alternative hypothesis that coffee with ≥97% organic 
ingredients is greater than coffee with ≥99% organic ingredients. For more equality of means 
analysis for coffee please see Table 3. 
Maple Syrup 
For syrup, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal mean bid prices for syrup with 
≥95% organic ingredients and the mean prices of conventional syrup; similarly for syrup with 
≥97% organic ingredients.  After eliminating zero bids for syrup, we see the same results but 
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with some different significance levels.  See Table 4 for all significance levels and additional 
equality of mean prices. 
Olive Oil 
For olive oil, the mean bid price for olive oil with ≥95% organic ingredients is the 
highest. We reject the null hypothesis that the olive oil with ≥95% organic ingredients is equal 
to the mean bids for conventional olive oil. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
olive oil with ≥95 organic ingredients is equal to the mean price of olive oil with ≥97% and ≥99% 
organic ingredients. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean price of olive oil 
with ≥97% organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean prices and olive oil with ≥99% 
organic ingredients. Additionally, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of olive oil with ≥99% 
organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean from all bids on olive oil.  
When omitting zeros we reject the null hypothesis that the mean bid for olive oil with 
≥95% organic ingredients is equal to the mean bid of olive oil with ≥97% and ≥99% organic 
ingredients. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality for organic olive oil with ≥97% 
organic ingredients with conventional means and ≥99%. See Table 5 for additional information. 
Treatment two 
 In these data, no participants bid zero so we have one set of results. The tests 
performed are that mean bid prices for two different purity levels of organic ingredients of a 
given food type are equal using a t-test. For all three goods, coffee, syrup and oil, mean bid 
prices increase with the purity level. For example, with olive oil, the mean bid price for olive oil 
with ≥95% organic ingredients is $5.83, for olive oil with ≥97% organic ingredients is $6.03 and 
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for olive oil with ≥99% organic ingredients is $6.33.  To confirm that these differences are 
statistically significant, we conducted a series of null hypotheses that pairs of mean bid prices 
are equal. In all cases the null hypothesis was rejected at the 1% significance level.  See Table 6 
for more details.  
Regression Analysis of Bid Prices  
We develop a multiple regression model to test the hypothesis that economic and personal 
attributes can explain some of the differences in bid prices for organic and conventional 
products of the same type across participants under treatment one. We first propose a model 
to explain the price of the organic or conventional version of a given food type and proceed to 
transform the model into one explaining price differences. Equation (1) is the model of the bid 
price for a given food product. 
(1)    
 
    
 
   
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
 
where: g (goods) = c,s, and o (c = coffee, s = maple syrup and o = olive oil), 
 i = 1,2 (1 = plain label and 2 = organic of some % purity), 
 j = individual, 
 Y = WTP bid. 
In equation (1), Xj is the vector of exogenous variables, i.e., economic and social attributes 
of a participant; Dm is a dummy variable for m = s (maple syrup), o (olive oil); and Pn is a dummy 
variable for n = 0(≥97% organic ingredients), 1(≥99% organic ingredients). The zero mean 
random disturbance term   
 
 represents the effect of other (excluded) variables on WTP.  
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Now consider the difference in an individual’s WTP for an organic version of a food product 
relative to a conventional version of the same product. Hence, we can take the difference in bid 
price equations for the organic and conventional version of (1) to obtain equation (2). 
(2)    
 
    
 
                               
where    
 
    
 
 is the bid price difference for the jth individual of good g,    (=   
 
    
 
) is the 
intercept term,  (=  
 
   
 
) is the vector of estimated coefficients associated with  , the 
vector of endogenous variables,   (=   
 
    
 
) is the coefficient for the dummy variable   for 
good syrup,   (=   
 
    
 
) is the coefficient for the dummy variable   for good oil,    
(=   
 
    
 
) is the coefficient for the dummy variable    for 97% organic ingredients, 
  (=   
 
    
 
) is the coefficient for the dummy variable    for 99% organic ingredients, and    
(=   
 
    
 
)is a new zero mean random disturbance term. For each dummy variable, a “yes” is 
designated as a 1 and another response is designated a 0. We then use coffee and greater than 
or equal to 95% purity as our respective reference commodity and purity level. 
We now define the difference equation for each good, g  = c, s, and o; 
(3)    
     
                     , 
(4)    
     
    
                       
 , 
(5)    
     
    
                        
  . 
Dummy variables for goods are omitted in the previous equations for ease of notation when a 
variable would have a value of zero. Equations (3), (4), and (5) can be stacked together to make 
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a regression model pooled over product types (coffee, maple syrup and olive oil) using 370 
observations.  
Empirical Model 
The exact empirical specification of the stacked version of equation (3), (4) and (5) is as 
follows: 
(6)                   
                                
  
                                                        
            . 
This specification was chosen because it included most of the variables that we had information 
on and for which we anticipated might explain bid price differences. See Table 7 for exact 
definitions of regressors. 
 We built the model thinking age2, ed, undrg, incmpp, labmore, infmore, envr, healthy,    
and    will all have positively signed coefficients, and age, incmpp
2, emag will have negatively 
signed coefficients. We think, and agree with some other studies, which show education and 
income have positive relationships with WTP for organic goods. Additionally we think that 
people who are more interested in food ingredients and organics have become more informed 
because of their preferences for organics, suggesting a positive relationship for WTP. Similarly, 
many health conscious consumers read food labels before purchasing a product which we think 
will be positively correlated with WTP. As we are unable to tell if a participant is employed in 
organic agriculture or farming and less than 1% of Iowa land acreage is organically certified we 
believe emag will have a negative sign (even as Iowa has the 5th most certified organic 
15 
 
operations as of 2008) (USDA: ERS 2010). One of our study questions is whether consumers are 
willing to pay more for higher levels of organic purity and we think they will be implying    and 
   will have positively signed coefficients.  
In Table 8, the following variables had coefficients that were significantly different from 
zero: an individual being a student, income per person, and the dummy for being a member of 
an environmental group are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Additionally, how 
well an individual was informed about organic foods had a coefficient significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level but not at the 5% level.  Next we performed a series of joint null 
hypotheses that coefficients of two or more related variables had coefficients that were zero: 
(i) age and age2 (ii) incmpp and incmpp2, (iii) Ds and Do and (iv) P0 and P1. The results of these 
tests are reported in Table 9. In this equation, the R2 for this equation is 0.114.  Based on the 
reported t- and F-tests, roughly P-values larger than 10%, and a little experimentation, we 
performed a test of the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on the following variables 
were zero:   age, age2, labmore, emag, healthy, Ds, and Do. The sample value of the F statistic is 
3.05 and the tabled value of the F statistic with 8 and 362 degrees of freedom is 5.02. We fail to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level (Prob > F = .570). 
Table 10 reports the estimated coefficients of our refined model (where this last set of 
variables has been excluded).  We exclude these regressors as they are both individually and 
jointly non-significant and do not focus directly on the question our study wished to address. 
The results in this regression are quite interesting. Additional education of an individual 
increases WTP for organic relative to a conventional version of a good. An individual being a 
16 
 
student increases willingness to pay for organic relative to conventional of a good. The more 
informed that an individual is informed about organic the more they are willing to pay for 
organics relative to a conventional good.  Finally, other things equal, below $76,100 of 
household income per person, an increase in income increases WTP for organic relative to 
conventional for a good. But above this level, additional income per capita reduces WTP. This 
non-linear marginal effect is graphed in Figures 1.  See the Appendix for derivation and 
additional information. The dummy variable for at least 97% organic purity is negative and the 
dummy variable for at least 99% purity is positive. However, these coefficients are not 
significant. Finally, in this refined model, the R2 is 0.100.  
Equality of Means of Differences 
 We run single variable F-tests to determine if there is a significant difference in the 
difference in WTP for the products, i.e., testing if at least 95% organic coffee less conventional 
coffee is equal to at least 97% organic coffee less conventional coffee.  We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in all cases other than with at least 95% and at least 99% organic syrup (at least 95% 
organic syrup less conventional syrup is equal to at least 97% organic syrup less conventional 
syrup; Prob > F = .037).  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our choice of products in the auctions was significantly limited due to availability of 
products as 100% organic and conventional. Questions during the experiment often resulted in 
inquiries as to what some of the products were. For example, participants frequently did not 
know what maple syrup was (often international participants had never seen or used it before).  
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We suggested maple syrup was a natural sweetening product from maple tree sap similar to 
honey but with a much lower relative viscosity and stronger taste.  Another problem is that 
coffee seems to be polarizing; it is either loved or hated. We think this accounts for the higher 
number of zero bids. 
From Table 1 we can see that many of the characteristics of the participants have high 
variance relative to the means. This is not a problem itself but these means and variances might 
not be representative of the general consumer.  Income really stands out with a mean of 
approximately $60,000 and a standard deviation of $47,500. We attempted to gather a 
representative sample of the population for our study but ideally we would have run the 
experiment in multiple locations within the Midwest with more participants. 
Our data suggest that consumers are generally willing to pay more for organic food 
products relative to conventional (see Table 11 for maximum and minimum bid amounts).  
Interestingly, participants in Treatment One bid zero for most of the products (all but two) 
whereas in Treatment Two no zero bids were recorded. Participants, however, were not 
necessarily willing to pay more for higher purity of organic food products already at a relatively 
high level of organic purity (at least 95%). Education, being a student, being informed about 
organics, being a member of an environmental group and having income up to ~$76,100 all 
contribute positively to WTP for organic goods relative to conventional goods.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Characteristics of Participants 
(N=154) 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Age Participant's age 37.06 15.48 
Gender 1 if participant is male 0.44 0.50 
Married 1 if participant is married 0.41 0.49 
White 1 if participant is white 0.72 0.44 
Smoke 1 if participant smokes 0.07 0.25 
Agriculture 1 if employed in agriculture or farming 0.08 0.27 
Undergraduate 1 if participant is an undergraduate student 0.10 0.30 
Household Number of individuals in participant's household 2.39 1.17 
Education Years of schooling completed 17.02 2.69 
Income Household income in $1,000s 60.69 47.55 
 
Table 2 – Treatment One Bids 
 ≥95% ≥97% ≥99% 
Coffee bids 40 39 50 
  Number of bids omitted 5 1 5 
Maple Syrup bids 50 40 39 
  Number of bids omitted 2 2 0 
Olive Oil bids 39 50 40 
  Number of bids omitted 0 1 1 
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Table 3 – Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Coffee (Treatment One)* 
Coffee 
 Conventional (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 1.609 (con95 mean) 2.134 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 1.859 (con97 mean) 2.481 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 1.458 (con99 mean) 1.916 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 1.626 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test* Significance Level 
  con all mean ha > 0.025 
  con95 mean  ha > 0.022 
  97 mean ha < 0.094 
  99 mean Fail to reject null  
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all ha > 0.001 
  con97 ha > 0.007 
  99 mean ha > 0.013 
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all ha > 0.076 
  con99 ha > 0.013 
Coffee – Omitting Zeros 
 Conventional  (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 1.950 (con95 mean) 2.445 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 1.908 (con97 mean) 2.546 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 1.778 (con99 mean) 2.129 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 1.873 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all mean Fail to reject null  
  con95 mean  Fail to reject null  
  97 mean ha < 0.059 
  99 mean Fail to reject null  
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all ha > 0.008 
  con97 ha > 0.012 
  99 mean ha > 0.078 
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con99 Fail to reject null  
*   All means in USD (Tables 3, 4, and 5) 
** Interpretation of “Hypothesis Test” – if reject null, hypothesis alternative (ha) signed 
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Table 4 – Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Maple Syrup (Treatment One) 
Maple Syrup 
 Conventional (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 2.347 (con95 mean) 2.738 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 2.949 (con97 mean) 2.937 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 2.234 (con99 mean) 4.068 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.485 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all mean Fail to reject null  
  con95 mean  Fail to reject null  
  97 mean Fail to reject null  
  99 mean ha < 0.001 
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con97 Fail to reject null  
  99 mean ha < 0.004 
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all ha > 0.000 
  con99 ha > 0.000 
Maple Syrup – Omitting Zeros 
 Conventional  (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 2.470 (con95 mean) 2.852 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 2.949 (con97 mean) 3.092 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 2.377 (con99 mean) 4.068 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.585 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all mean Fail to reject null  
  con95 mean  Fail to reject null  
  97 mean Fail to reject null  
  99 mean ha < 0.000 
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con97 Fail to reject null  
  99 mean ha < 0.004 
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all ha > 0.000 
  con99 ha > 0.000 
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Table 5 – Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Olive Oil (Treatment One) 
Olive Oil 
 Conventional (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 2.125 (con95 mean) 3.303 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 2.525 (con97 mean) 2.531 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 2.159 (con99 mean) 2.560 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.259 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all mean ha > 0.001 
  con95 mean  ha > 0.001 
  97 mean ha > 0.012 
  99 mean ha > 0.015 
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con97 Fail to reject null  
  99 mean Fail to reject null  
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con99 ha > 0.060 
Olive Oil – Omitting Zeros 
 Conventional  (name) Organic (name) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥95% bids) 2.125 (con95 mean) 3.303 (95 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥97% bids) 2.525 (con97 mean) 2.582 (97 mean) 
Mean WTP (from con. vs ≥99% bids) 2.249 (con99 mean) 2.624 (99 mean) 
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.295 (con all mean)  
t test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all mean ha > 0.002 
  con95 mean  ha > 0.001 
  97 mean ha > 0.017 
  99 mean ha > 0.023 
t test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con97 Fail to reject null  
  99 mean Fail to reject null  
t test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
  con all Fail to reject null  
  con99 Fail to reject null  
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Table 6 – Treatment Two Equality of Means Across Purity Levels 
                  (means in USD) 
Coffee 
 ≥95% (name) ≥97% (name) ≥99% (name) 
Means 5.537 (95 mean) 5.725 (97 mean) 5.94 (99 mean) 
t tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
 95 mean = 97 mean ha < 0.001 
 95 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.001 
 97 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.001 
Maple Syrup 
 ≥95% (name) ≥97% (name) ≥99% (name) 
Means 6.567 (95 mean) 6.884 (97 mean) 7.365 (99 mean) 
t tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
 95 mean = 97 mean ha < 0.008 
 95 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.002 
 97 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.002 
Olive Oil 
 ≥95% (name) ≥97% (name) ≥99% (name) 
Means 5.831 (95 mean) 6.029 (97 mean) 6.327 (99 mean) 
t tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level 
 95 mean = 97 mean ha < 0.003 
 95 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.004 
 97 mean = 99 mean ha < 0.009 
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Table 7 – Regression Analysis: Variable Names and Definitions 
age Age Age of participant in years 
age2 Age x age Age of participant in years squared 
ed Education Years of education of participant 
undrg Undergraduate (=1) Dummy variable for an undergraduate student (unmarried, 18-
24 years of age, and yearly household income less than $10,00) 
incmpp Income per person Household income (in $1,000s)divided by the number of people 
per household 
Incmpp2 Income per person x 
income per person 
Household income (in $1,000s)divided by the number of people 
per household squared 
labmore Read label more (=1) How often the participant looks at a food label – more often 
than not 
infmore Well to extremely well 
informed (=1) 
How well the participant is informed about organics –  well to 
extremely well 
emag Employed in agriculture 
or farming (=1) 
Dummy variable for employment in agriculture or farming 
envr Member of 
environmental group (=1) 
Dummy variable for being a member of an environmental group 
healthy Physically healthy 
participant (=1) 
Dummy variable for participant in good to excellent health 
Ds Maple syrup (=1) Dummy variable for maple syrup 
Do Olive oil (=1) Dummy variable for olive oil 
P0 At least 97% organic (=1) Dummy variable for organic purity of at least 97% 
P1 At least 99% organic (=1) Dummy variable for organic purity of at least 99% 
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Table 8 – OLS General Model of Price Differences: Organic less Conventional 
Regressors Coefficients Standard Errors 
Intercept -0.873 0.602 
Age -0.003 0.031 
Age x age -0.000005 0.0004 
Education  0.059** 0.026 
Undergraduate (=1)  0.627** 0.214 
Income per person  0.023** 0.010 
Income per person x income per person -0.0002 0.0001 
Read label more (=1)  0.045 0.119 
Well to extremely well informed (=1)  0.227**~ 0.118 
Employed in agriculture or faming (=1) -0.245 0.213 
Member of environmental group (=1)  0.342** 0.165 
Physically healthy participant (=1) -0.144 0.212 
Maple syrup (=1)  0.217** 0.123 
Olive oil (=1) -0.050 0.122 
At least 97% organic (=1) -0.078 0.121 
At least 99% organic (=1)  0.064 0.122 
R2  0.114 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
~ marginal significance (within 1% of being significant) 
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Table 9 – Fitted Model Joint Tests 
Regressors/Hypothesis Test Probability > F (or P values) 
age = 0 
age2 = 0 
0.684 
incmpp = 0 
incmpp2 = 0 
0.001 
Do = 0 
Ds = 0 
0.185 
P0 = 0 
P1 = 0 
0.502 
age = 0 
age2 = 0 
emag = 0 
healthy = 0 
labmore = 0 
Do = 0 
Ds = 0 
0.570 
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Table 10 – OLS Refined Model of Price Differences: Organic less Conventional 
Regressors Coefficients Standard Errors 
Intercept -0.928** 0.436 
Education  0.057** 0.024 
Undergraduate (=1)  0.607** 0.207 
Income per person  0.017** 0.008 
Income per person x income per person -0.0001 0.0001 
Relatively more informed about organics (=1)  0.202* 0.110 
Member of environmental group (=1)  0.325** 0.163 
At least 97% organic (=1) -0.098 0.121 
At least 99% organic (=1)  0.048 0.122 
R2  0.100 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
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Table 12 – Bid Ranges in USD 
Treatment One Bids 
 Max Min 
Coffee   
  Conventional 4.50 0.00 
  ≥95% Organic 6.50 0.00 
  ≥97% Organic 7.00 0.00 
  ≥99% Organic 5.00 0.00 
Maple Syrup   
  Conventional 9.95 0.00 
  ≥95% Organic 11.00 0.00 
  ≥97% Organic 12.00 0.00 
  ≥99% Organic 11.11 0.25 
Olive Oil   
  Conventional 10.00 0.00 
  ≥95% Organic 9.00 0.25 
  ≥97% Organic 10.00 0.00 
  ≥99% Organic 6.50 0.00 
Treatment Two Bids 
 Min Max 
Coffee   
  ≥95% Organic 4.30 0.13 
  ≥97% Organic 4.50 0.13 
  ≥99% Organic 5.00 0.13 
Maple Syrup   
  ≥95% Organic 8.00 0.30 
  ≥97% Organic 8.00 0.40 
  ≥99% Organic 10.00 0.50 
Olive Oil   
  ≥95% Organic 4.40 0.50 
  ≥97% Organic 4.60 0.50 
  ≥99% Organic 5.00 0.50 
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Figure 1 – Difference in WTP as a Function of Income Per Person 
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Appendix: Nonlinear marginal effects of income per capita 
With age and income per person we look at the two following equations to find the 
minimum and maximum amounts respectively: 
(7)                         
 , 
Taking the derivative of (7) with respect to income per person, setting the equation equal to 
zero, and substituting in the estimated coefficients we get the following: 
(8) 
  
       
               ̂   , 
(9)       ̂   
   
   
  
    
          
        .5 
From equation (7) and results from Table 10 we plot the effect of per capita household income 
on the differenced WTP (Figure 1). 
 
                                                      
5 Coefficients used in actual estimation have greater precision than shown in equation 9. 
